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In the present paper, we review evidence for of a model in which the inferior frontal
gyrus/anterior insula (IFG/AI) area is involved in elaborate attentional and working memory
processing and we present the hypothesis that this processing may take different forms
and may have different effects, depending on the task at hand: (1) it may facilitate fast and
accurate responding, or (2) it may cause slow responding when prolonged elaborate pro-
cessing is required to increase accuracy of responding, or (3) it may interfere with accuracy
and speed of next-trial (for instance, post-error) performance when prolonged elaborate
processing interferes with processing of the next stimulus. We present our viewpoint
that ventrolateral corticolimbic control pathways, including the IFG/AI, and mediodorsal
corticolimbic control pathways, including dorsal anterior cingulate cortex areas, play partly
separable, but interacting roles in adaptive behavior in environmental conditions that differ
in the level of predictability: compared to dorsal feed-forward control, the ventral corticol-
imbic control pathways implement control over actions through higher responsiveness to
momentary environmental stimuli.This latter control mode is associatedwith an attentional
focus on stimuli that are urgent or close in time and space, while the former control mode
is associated with a broader, more global focus in time and space. Both control pathways
have developed extensively through evolution, and both developed their own “cogni-
tive controls,” such that neither one can be properly described as purely “cognitive” or
“emotional.”We discuss literature that suggests that the role of IFG/AI in top-down control
is reﬂected in cortical rhythms and event-related potentials. Together, the literature sug-
gests that the IFG/AI is an important node in brain networks that control cognitive and
emotional processing and behavior.
Keywords: post-error slowing, post-conflict slowing, speed–accuracy trade-off, cognitive control, inferior frontal
gyrus, anterior insula, event-related potentials, cortical rhythms
INTRODUCTION
Performance adjustments following conﬂict or erroneous
responses, as well as changes in speed–accuracy trade-off, are
regarded as examples of cognitive control and are most often
ascribed to brain areas such as medial frontal cortex/anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Although
these performance adjustments have also been associated with
activity in a ventrolateral prefrontal cortical area (that includes sev-
eral sub-areas including the inferior frontal junction) that we will
broadly refer to as inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula (IFG/AI),
such activity is often discounted as being related to motor inhi-
bition or orienting responses, and not functionally meaningful or
“cognitive.” In the present opinion paper, we will present a model,
and discuss evidence, suggesting that the IFG/AI is involved in
elaborate attentional andworkingmemory processing and present
the hypothesis that this processing may take different forms and
may have different effects, depending on the task at hand: (1) it
may facilitate fast and accurate responding,or (2) itmay cause slow
responding when prolonged elaborate processing is required to
increase accuracy of responding, or (3) it may interfere with accu-
racy and speed of next-trial (for instance, post-error) performance
when prolonged elaborate processing interferes with processing of
the next stimulus. Through this function, IFG/AI appears involved
in minimizing interference effects in ﬂanker and Stroop tasks, in
slowing effects such as post-error slowing, post-conﬂict slowing,
and in speed–accuracy trade-off.
Although we think there is converging support for this func-
tion of IFG/AI, we do not argue for a focus on the IFG/AI at the
expense of investigation of the ACC, of interactions between areas
including ACC and IFG/AI, or at the expense of more detailed
characterization of areas within IFG/AI and ACC and their par-
ticipation in brain networks. Rather, because functions of areas
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including dorsal ACC have more often been described as cognitive,
while functions of IFG/AI, and the ventral corticolimbic control
pathways it is part of (including also the amygdala), have often
been described as emotional, in this paper we want to distil from
the literature an emerging picture of IFG/AI contributions to cog-
nition and focus on characterizing the cognitive control functions
the IFG/AI might have. In doing so, we are guided by our view-
point that ventral corticolimbic control pathways that include the
IFG/AI, and dorsal corticolimbic control pathways that include
dorsal ACC areas, are interacting but partly separable by their
respective adaptations to environmental conditions that differ in
the level of predictability (Tops et al., 2010). We will discuss that,
in our opinion, both control pathways continued to develop dur-
ing evolution, and both developed their own “cognitive controls,”
such that neither one can be properly described as “cognitive” nor
“emotional” (Tops et al., 2010). More general and balanced discus-
sions of theories and research of cognitive control and post-error
adjustments can be found in other contributions to this Research
Topic (e.g., Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011).
Increasing attention to the role of IFG/AI could have impor-
tant implications and could facilitate future research in several
directions. For instance, cognition and ACC function are increas-
ingly being investigated in the context of psychopathology,mental
health, and stress. However, the IFG/AI is among the areas that
most consistently show increased activity related to anxiety and
stress (see for ameta-analysis Etkin andWager,2007; for discussion
Tops and Boksem, 2011).
In Section “Cognitive Control in the Brain,” we will argue that
IFG/AI has a relatively neglected role in cognitive control that is
different from ACC. In Section“Cognition and Emotion in Dorsal
and Ventral Corticolimbic Control Pathways” we will present our
general model of ventral and dorsal control pathways and their
role in cognition. In Section “The Role of IFG/AI in Cognitive
Control”we focus on cognitive control functions of IFG/AI in the
ventral control pathways, and how this functionmay be implicated
in minimizing interference effects in ﬂanker and Stroop tasks, in
slowing effects such as post-error slowing, post-conﬂict slowing,
and in speed–accuracy trade-off. In Section “Support for a Role of
IFG/AI in Cognitive Control”we discuss evidence for involvement
of IFG/AI in these interference and slowing effects. In Section
“Long-Term Goals” we suggest that both ventral and dorsal con-
trol pathways can direct behavior toward long- and short-time
goals, but in different ways. Finally, we discuss evidence suggesting
that the role of IFG/AI in top-down control is reﬂected in cortical
rhythms and event-related potentials.
COGNITIVE CONTROL IN THE BRAIN
Functional neuroimaging studies suggest that dorsal ACC plays
an important role in cognitive control. This brain area is reli-
ably activated when tasks require the ongoing adjustment of the
allocation of attention. The ACC has come to occupy a central
role in theories of attention and cognitive control, which hold
that the ACC either monitors response conﬂict, signaling the need
for adjustments in cognitive processes, or directly mediates such
adjustments (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001). However, it has been
shown that subjects with damage to the dorsal ACC show normal
adjustments in performance following manipulations in response
conﬂict in both Stroop and go–no-go tasks. Furthermore, dam-
age to the ACC did not impair performance on anterior attention
tasks, post-error slowing, nor the ability to adjust performance in
response to explicit speed or accuracy instructions, arguing against
a necessary role for the ACC in these processes (Fellows and Farah,
2005; Baird et al., 2006).
A study in which the ACC was lesioned in monkeys, showed
that the ACC is not involved in detecting or correcting errors, but
in guiding voluntary behavior based on the history of actions and
outcomes (Kennerley et al., 2006). ACC lesions did not impair the
performance of the monkeys immediately after errors, but made
them unable to integrate rewards and punishments over multi-
ple trials to guide the continuation of behavior. But if the ACC is
not involved in next-trial response–adjustments, this means that
this kind of computations and behavioral control is performed
elsewhere, and that the outcomes of such computations are for-
warded to the ACC, in order to be integrated over multiple trials,
guiding the choice of a general behavioral set and level of engage-
ment. Interestingly, in a recent fMRI study dorsal ACC activity was
not sensitive to Stroop congruency, error likelihood, or response
conﬂict after controlling for increased brain activity with time-
on-trial, suggesting that the greater ACC activity on incompatible
trials may stem from longer reaction times rather than response
conﬂict; however, left IFG activity was correlated with increased
Stroop congruency effects (Grinband et al., 2011). There is discus-
sion about the study of Grinband et al. (Yeung et al., 2011), and
there appears to be evidence for involvement of rostral ACC in
next-trial cognitive control (di Pellegrino et al., 2007). Our inten-
tion is not to argue againstACC involvement in next-trial cognitive
control, but to highlight potential IFG/AI contributions.
There is growing support for, and attention to, the role of
IFG/AI pathways in executive functions such as post-error slow-
ing that have so far largely been ascribed to the ACC–prefrontal
cortical circuit, and recognition of the involvement of orienting
responses in such functions (Tucker et al., 2003; Tops, 2004; Brass
et al., 2005; Tops et al., 2006, 2010; Boksem et al., 2008; Eck-
ert et al., 2009; Notebaert et al., 2009; Tops and Boksem, 2010,
2011; Ullsperger et al., 2010; Ide and Li, 2011). Where less then
10 years ago strong activation of the IFG/AI was regarded of no
importance, and in an astonishing number of cases was reported
without comment, an extraordinary convergence of evidence has
since prompted authors to describe this area as the integral hub
and convergence zone between networks that control behavior
in low-predictable environments (Bossaerts, 2010; Craig, 2010;
Menon and Uddin, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010; Tops et al., 2010;
Higo et al., 2011). Likewise, while classically considered a limbic
region, recent evidence from network analysis suggests a critical
role for the IFG/AI in high-level cognitive control and attentional
processes (Craig, 2010).
COGNITION AND EMOTION IN DORSAL AND VENTRAL
CORTICOLIMBIC CONTROL PATHWAYS
Research investigating the evolution and ontogeny of the pre-
frontal cortex suggests that the lateral prefrontal cortex initially
emerged from ventrolateral prefrontal regions, followed by dorso-
lateral and then anterolateral cortices (Flechsig, 1901, 1920; Fuster
et al., 1997).Wepreviously argued that evolutiondidnot lead to the
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development of separate brain systems for emotion vs. cognition,
but did lead to the development of partially separate ventro-
lateral and mediodorsal control pathways sustaining behavioral
programs adapted to different environments (Tops et al., 2010).
We previously described how the distinction between ventrolateral
and mediodorsal control pathways can be applied to literatures
about temperament, personality, emotion, and psychopathology
(Tops et al., 2010). However, the theory of Tucker and Luu from
which it was developed has also been applied to cognitive control
(e.g., in the empirical work of Luu and Tucker) and the modula-
tion by emotion of the width of attention (reviewed by Friedman
and Förster, 2010). In Figure 1 we present a model of our hypoth-
esis regarding how the ventral and dorsal control pathways are
implicated in cognitive control, with a relative focus on the often
neglected ventral controls.
In short, the revisedmodel of Tucker and colleagues (Tops et al.,
2010) proposes that two types of brain systems developed during
evolution.One typewas adapted to control cognition andbehavior
in high-predictable environments. These systems control behavior
guided by context models; models that are formed in long-term
memory by the predictability of the environment/context. The
other type of system was adapted to control cognition and behav-
ior in low-predictable environments. In low-predictable environ-
ments, effective context models can not be formed nor used to
control behavior in adaptiveways. Instead,behavior is guided reac-
tively by momentary feedback control by environmental stimuli.
This reactive guidance by momentary environmental stimuli is
associated with attentional focus on stimuli that are urgent and
close in time and space. Those stimuli can be positive (“I have to
catch that reward that is in my reach before it gets away”) or nega-
tive (“I have to get away from that danger before it gets me, because
I’m in its reach”). The reactive systems are involved in, and relate
stimuli to, the experienced self in the here and now. In contrast,
there is less urgency and focus on the moment (i.e., broader, more
global focus in time and space)when behavior is guided proactively
(in feed-forward fashion) by context models. Playful exploration
of the environment may be stimulated by this type of control, to
support the construction and updating of context models.
Friedman and Förster (2010) reviewed literature showing that
positive emotional states and implicit affective cues expand (global
focus), and that negative emotional states and implicit affec-
tive cues constrict (local focus), the scope of attention on both
the perceptual and conceptual level. They concluded that a large
and growing body of research supports the model and assump-
tions that originated from Tucker’s work. Starting with Tucker’s
neuropsychological theory (e.g., Tyler and Tucker, 1982; Tucker
and Williamson, 1984; Derryberry and Tucker, 1994; Luu et al.,
1998), early studies were collectively inspired by a set of converg-
ing empirical and theoretical contributions (e.g., Schwarz, 1990;
Tucker et al., 1995; Fredrickson, 1998). Friedman and Förster also
discussed recent ﬁndings and ideas by Harmon-Jones and Gable,
which, as an exception, did not appear to ﬁt the theoretical frame-
work. These authors reported several studies in which reactive
positive (appetitive, e.g., hunger) reward motivation facilitated a
FIGURE 1 | Schematic depiction of the roles of ventral and dorsal
corticolimbic control pathways in cognitive control, focusing on ventral
control. At the level of the IFG/AI interoceptive, limbic emotion–motivational,
and sensory inputs are integrated. IFG/AI connects back to somatosensory,
limbic, and sensory/attentional orienting areas to regulating the level of
activation of representations that are relevant for response selection. IFG/AI
may also keep the representations and goals active as part of maintenance
working memory function. IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; AI, anterior insula; VS,
ventral striatum; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex;
dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; dlpfc, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex;
pSMA, presupplementary motor area; WM, working memory; STM,
short-term memory.
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local focus (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones and
Gable, 2009). Although the attempt by Friedman and Förster to
reconcile the ideas of Gable and Harmon-Jones with their own
ideas and the general framework ﬁgured prominently in their
original review article, Harmon-Jones et al. (2011b) published
a comment in Psychological Bulletin proposing an alternative
model to explain the ﬁndings. However, in their reply, Fried-
man and Förster (2011) argue that the alternative model fails
to establish a compelling alternative explanation for the multi-
tude of speciﬁc ﬁndings they reviewed. Interestingly and impor-
tantly, the revision and update of Tucker’s model we published
last year actually prominently discussed the ﬁndings of Gable
and Harmon-Jones to explain how small revisions to the origi-
nal model increase the explaining power and ﬁt to the literature
(Tops et al., 2010).
The revised model retains the hypothesis that the systems asso-
ciated with the context models are biased toward positive emotion,
optimism, self-efﬁcacy, and conﬁdence, because the context mod-
els are based on previous predictive success and positive outcomes.
However, one adjustment is the addition of a reactive system with
a narrow focus in space and time on obtaining rewards, in addi-
tion to the reactive system with a narrow focus in space and
time on avoiding punishment or harm. This additional appetitive
reactive reward-oriented system incorporates the ﬁndings (local
focus when reactive reward motivation is stimulated) and ideas of
Harmon-Jones et al. (2011b) within the broader framework that
was built from Tucker and colleagues’s original work. Moreover,
it also seems to incorporate ﬁndings with other outcome mea-
sures in the research by Förster and colleagues (e.g., Förster, 2009;
Liberman and Förster, 2009). They found that a global attentional
focus was associated with larger psychological distances in time
and space, “promotion focus,” high power and a focus on similar-
ities (which is compatible with the formation of context models),
while a local attentional focus was associated with small psycho-
logical distances in time and space, “prevention focus,” low power
and a focus on differences.
According to the self-regulation theory of Higgins (1997), a
promotion focus guides behavior according to ideals and aspi-
rations, while a prevention focus guides behavior according to
“oughts” such as safety and responsibilities. Interestingly, a recent
theory of reasoning and decision making proposes that dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex represents behavior-guiding principles for
evaluating the permissibility or fairness of observed behaviorwhile
social norms for necessary (obligatory or prohibited) courses of
action are represented by ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Barbey
et al., 2009). Promotion relative to prevention focus has been asso-
ciated with perceptions of power and predictability (e.g., Langens,
2007). Behavior control by social norms for necessary courses of
action in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex may have developed from
its attentional focus on stimuli that are urgent and close in time
and space, while reﬂection on ideals, permissibility, and fairness
may be allowed for when there is less urgency and focus on the
moment and may involve activation of context models. Barley et
al. argue that, from an evolutionary perspective, the emergence
of lateral prefrontal cortex subregions reﬂects their relative pri-
ority for the formation of organized social groups. Furthermore,
consistent with its evolutionary development, the ontogeny of the
lateral prefrontal cortex reﬂects the importance of ﬁrst represent-
ing social norms for necessary behavior (i.e., fundamental rules
the child must obey), followed by an understanding of permis-
sible courses of action (e.g., guided by judgments of equity and
fairness), and ﬁnally high-order inferences involving both forms
of representation (Barbey et al., 2009). The work by Barbey et al.
(2009)may extend ourmodel to the realmof higher order process-
ing such as social reasoning and decision making, and inductive
and deductive inference making.
The present model seems related to the well-known hypoth-
esized distinction between ventral and dorsal posterior visual
processing streams specialized respectively in processing of “what”
and “how” information (Goodale and Milner, 1992). According
to Goodale and Milner, the dorsal pathway extracts visual signals
relevant for driving automatic or feed-forward motor behavior
(perception for action),whereas the ventral pathway extracts infor-
mation relevant for identiﬁcation and other forms of semantic
knowledge. It has been suggested that these processing streams are
extended toward frontal ventral and dorsal areas that feed back
to implement cognitive control (Sakagami et al., 2006; O’Reilly,
2010). Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (IFG/AI) mediates active
maintenance of stimulus information, and this produces a top-
down biasing effect to drive selection and retrieval dynamics in
posterior cortex. On the other hand, one should expect to see dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex activation whenever the dorsal parietal
cortex requires extra cognitive control (such as working mem-
ory and top-down biasing) to carry out the processing of sensory
information to guide action outputs (O’Reilly, 2010; cf. Sakagami
et al., 2006). Although similar, compared to this account our
model seems more integrative, associating ventral and dorsal sys-
tems with behavioral programs that include motivation, emotion,
viscerosensation, and memory (Tops et al., 2010).
Figure 1 shows that at the level of the IFG/AI interoceptive,
limbic emotion–motivational, and sensory inputs are integrated
(Craig, 2008, 2009). Based on reviews of these and other ﬁndings,
Craig reasoned that in the IFG/AI an integrated representation is
formed of the global emotional moment, i.e., that awareness of the
immediate moment is formed. Also in our model, the IFG/AI is an
integration and control node in ventral networks that implement
“immediate” reactivity to sensory stimuli, and “immediate” con-
nection between sensory processing and action control. Adapted
to low-predictable environments, ventral control applies a nar-
row spatial (target-focused) and temporal (immediate moment)
focus to processing, action control, and awareness (cf. Craig,2009).
In contrast, adapted to predictable environments, dorsal con-
trol applies a wider spatial and temporal focus, which allows for
recruitment of context models, and sustained control over behav-
ioral episodes according to information conveyed by temporally
remote events and history of actions and outcomes, and imple-
mentation of feed-forward control of behavioral patterns and
integrated action sequences (Heidbreder and Groenewegen, 2003;
Kennerley et al., 2006; Kouneiher et al., 2009). The wider temporal
focus produces awareness that includes a sense of past and future.
Notice that quite differently from reactive ventral control, feed-
forward implementation, and execution of action sequences may
be facilitated by suppressing ongoing processing of sensory input
that might disrupt motor output (Jacobs and Fornal, 1995).
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Classical work showed that affective arousal states carry
resource information (physiological resources such as glucose lev-
els and the condition of muscles, as well as social resources) and are
associated with implicit perceptions of coping abilities (Thayer,
1989). Only in low-predictable environments it is necessary to
have a continuous readout of the level of available resources to
constrain immediate action. In the IFG/AI information about the
level of resources is combined with emotional or “drive” informa-
tion that biases the direction of action either toward (approach,
e.g., craving, hunger, love, trust) or away from (avoidance, e.g.,
disgust, pain, distrust) a target object (Tops and de Jong, 2006;
Tops et al., 2010). This directional drive property may have been
derived from functions of the gustatory cortex that is situated in
the insula. The directional drive bias and resource information
is furthermore combined with relevant target information and,
depending on circumstances, priming or preparation of responses
and matching autonomic responses (Heidbreder and Groenewe-
gen, 2003). Together, the continuous readout of drive direction
bias, resource level, and orienting toward potential targets enable
fast, opportunistic action at the spur of the moment. In other
words, it may enable us to catch a reward that is in our reach
before it gets away and to get away from a danger before it gets
us, when we are in its reach. In contrast, in predictable environ-
ments dorsal control enables fast and efﬁcient action by means of
feed-forward action control and guidance by context models.
In many situations and for many tasks, dorsal, and ventral sys-
tems will collaborate and interact in the control of behavior. For
instance, support has been found for interactions between IFG and
dorsal frontal areas, where IFG implements reactive (momentary)
immediate action according to the information conveyed by con-
comitant contextual signals, while dorsal frontal areas implement
“proactive” episodic motivation control: sustained control over
behavioral episodes according to information conveyed by tem-
porally remote events (or context models) and history of actions
and outcomes, and implementation of feed-forward control of
behavioral patterns and integrated action sequences (Heidbreder
and Groenewegen, 2003; Kennerley et al., 2006; Kouneiher et al.,
2009). However, temporary or relatively stable biases toward reac-
tive control may result from temperament, unpredictable dan-
gerous or urgent situations, perceptions of unpredictability after
trauma or inconsistent parenting, and interactions between those.
In contrast, bias toward context model-guided control may relate
to temperament or follow consistent parenting and predictable,
secure early environments that favored exploration and the devel-
opment of context models (i.e., internal working models, in terms
of Bowlby’s (1988) attachment theory).
The input and feedback to IFG/AI and back to somatosen-
sory, limbic and sensory/attentional orienting areas as depicted
by arrows in Figure 1, ﬁt the consistent implication of IFG/AI
activity in somatosensory working memory (e.g., Auksztulewicz
et al., 2011), anxiety, and somatic complaints (Paulus and Stein,
2006; Etkin and Wager, 2007; Tops and Boksem, 2011). We suggest
that during evolution cognitive control areas have developed that
are basically control areas involved in temperament, emotion reg-
ulation, and stress responding (Cromwell and Panksepp, 2011),
but now also implicated in cognitive task performance. Hence,
we think the model in Figure 1 can be applied to temperament,
emotion regulation, stress responding, as well as to cognitive con-
trol. However, the next sections of this paper will focus on the
involvement of the connections between IFG/AI and the ventral
processing stream in cognitive control.
THE ROLE OF IFG/AI IN COGNITIVE CONTROL
In Figure 1, the feedback connection between IFG/AI and ven-
tral sensory cortex is meant to illustrate the role of IFG/AI in
regulating the level of activation of representations in posterior
brain areas that are relevant or irrelevant, respectively, for response
selection (Higo et al., 2011). In other words, those connections
have a role in the coordination of focal elaborate processing of
target stimuli; focal in time and space. Depending on the require-
ments of the task at hand, these connections together with output
to motor cortex allow for tight feedback control of action. This
means that IFG/AI is involved both in monitoring target or cue
events and in updating the corresponding action plan. One exam-
ple that supports such a combination of functions is a study that
combined the causal methodology of reversible cortical interfer-
ence (transcranial magnetic stimulation) with an experimental
task that measured different types of updating. This study found
that the right inferior frontal cortex can be functionally segregated
into two subregions: an inferior frontal junction region that seems
critical for visual detection of changes in the environment, and a
more ventral IFG region, which updates the corresponding action
plan (Verbruggen et al., 2010).
However, if the target stimulus is removed before (elaborate)
processing is ﬁnished, processing may proceed on a short-term
memory representation of the target or sensory input. Much has
been learned over the last two decades on where in the brain work-
ing memory functions are carried out. Much less is known on how
the brain accomplishes short-term maintenance and goal-directed
manipulation of information. One view proposed a functional
distinction, arguing that ventrolateral areas are mostly involved
in pure maintenance of information and keeping representations
active without external input, whereas dorsolateral areas are more
involved in tasks requiring some processing of the memorized
material (Owen,2000). The IFGappears to project back to the tem-
poral lobe to keep target/object representations active (Assadollahi
and Rockstroh, 2008) and may do so through mechanisms of
synchronization of neuronal ﬁring (cf. Hommel et al., 2006). We
suggest that similar feedback connections may be implicated both
in regulating the level of activation of representations in posterior
brain areas that are relevant to prevent interference from irrelevant
simultaneous representations, and in regulating the level of acti-
vation of representations in posterior brain areas that are relevant
to prevent decay or interference from subsequent representations.
However, as we are not aware of much evidence for this suggested
mechanism, we leave the exact mechanism of short-term memory
or maintenance working memory in the IFG/AI open.
Both prolonged focus on, and processing of, potentially
ambiguous or relevant target representations that are still updated
in sensory cortex, and prolonged processing of targets that have
been removed from input channels, constitute what has been
called a“redundancy bias” to processing in ventral systems (Tucker
et al., 1995). Importantly, although both operations exclude the
continuous stream of sensory input largely or completely from
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momentary awareness, momentary awareness itself is continued
with focus on the target. That is, if processing is performed on
a short-term memory representation, the “emotional moment”
(Craig, 2009) constitutes of outcomes of this processing in IFG/AI
and simultaneous inputs such as limbic drive and somatosensory
inputs.
Prolonged processing of targets that have been removed from
input channels (or replaced or updated) places that target in
momentary awareness, and excludes subsequent stimuli and tar-
gets frommomentary awareness for the duration of this prolonged
processing. This may cause interference with IFG/AI mediated
processing and momentary awareness of stimuli following targets
in rapid serial visual presentation tasks and following stimu-
lus events that would trigger prolonged elaborate processing in
speeded reaction time tasks, such as performance errors, incon-
gruent ﬂankers, novelty, saliency, ambiguity, or cues of rule change
(Figure 1). We think that this interference with the process-
ing of subsequent stimuli is involved in post-error slowing and
post-conﬂict slowing.
We leave open whether control from the IFG/AI involves any
active inhibition of processing or action, or only activation of
representations (input or behavior) that compete with other rep-
resentations, which has been suggested to be a more parsimonious
explanation of IFG/AI functions (Hampshire et al., 2010). In terms
of visual processing, inhibition of one object when attention is
focused on another can be explained as a secondary effect, i.e.,
an emergent property of local competition when one competing
item is subjected to top-downpotentiating signalswhich have their
source in the IFG/AI and may reﬂect willful focusing of attention
(Hampshire et al., 2010). However, this leaves the possibility that
motor programs of immobility or behavioral inhibition are part
of innate stimulus – response programs or are often used and
therefore primed in certain individuals (Tops and Boksem, 2011).
Similarly, we will not discuss extensive evidence that IFG/AI
may inhibit processing of emotional stimuli in sensory cortex,
memory, and limbic areas. Although this literature is too exten-
sive and complicated to discuss within the scope of this paper, we
will mention a few examples, because we think emotion control
by the IFG/AI may involve mechanisms that are similar to, and
may overlap with, those implementing cognitive control. In one
study, anticipatory bilateral IFG/AI activation before picture pre-
sentation was inversely correlated with superior temporal gyrus
(STG) activation during presentation of scary pictures in anxiety
prone individuals, suggesting that IFG/AI activation suppressed
the sensory representation in STG (Simmons et al., 2006). Accord-
ing to another study, emotional memories are initially suppressed
by the right IFG over regions supporting sensory components
of the memory representation (visual cortex, thalamus; Depue
et al., 2007). One explanation for these ﬁndings is that the right
IFG is engaged in a coping strategy – for example retrieving an
alternative thought, image, or memory in order to swamp lim-
ited capacity processing resources (Hampshire et al., 2010). Wager
et al. (2008) identiﬁed a right IFG/AI region whose activity corre-
latedwith reduced negative emotional experience during cognitive
reappraisal of aversive images. They then applied a pathway-
mapping analysis on subcortical regions to locate mediators of
the association between IFG/AI activity and reappraisal success
(i.e., reductions in reported emotion). They identiﬁed two sepa-
rable pathways that together explained approximately 50% of the
reported variance in self-reported emotion: (1) a path through
nucleus accumbens that predicted greater reappraisal success, and
(2) a path through ventral amygdala that predicted reduced reap-
praisal success (i.e.,more negative emotion). These results provide
direct evidence that IFG/AI is involved in both the generation
and regulation of emotion through different subcortical pathways.
Maybe this resultmeans that the right IFG is involved in the passive
coping strategy of emotion-focused coping by amplifying positive
vs. negative emotions.
SUPPORT FOR A ROLE OF IFG/AI IN COGNITIVE CONTROL
FLANKER INCONGRUENCY EFFECTS AND SPEED–ACCURACY
TRADE-OFF
The right IFG/AI may have an alarm/orienting function as part of
its critical role in the switching between internally and externally
oriented control modes in response to salient stimuli (Sridha-
ran et al., 2008). Furthermore, the IFG/AI may coordinate and
participate in further processing of salient and/or ambiguous
stimuli. Leitman et al. (2010) showed that increased saliency of
emotion-speciﬁc acoustic cues was associated with increased acti-
vation in key components of the ventral emotional/attentional
system including STG, insula, and amygdala, whereas decreased
saliency of acoustic cues was associated with increased IFG activity
and IFG–STG connectivity. These results suggest that sensory-
integrative processing that is central in emotional intensity and
attentional absorption is facilitated when the stimulus is rich in
affective information, yielding increased activation in temporal
cortex and amygdala. Conversely,when the stimulus is ambiguous,
greater evaluative processes are recruited, increasing activation in
IFG, and IFG–STG connectivity (Leitman et al., 2010).
Incongruency in a ﬂanker task activates the IFG/AI and under-
lying striatum area, and although the direction of the relationship
is inconsistent over studies, activity in this area was in some stud-
ies correlated with the ﬂanker incongruency effect on reaction
times (Bunge et al., 2002; Wager et al., 2005); a relationship was
also found with the incongruency effect on reaction times dur-
ing a Stroop task (Melcher and Gruber, 2008). The IFG/AI–ACC
network is thought to be involved in incongruency detection or
resolving,and/or in inhibitory processes that dampen the tendency
to make an inappropriate response (e.g., Aron et al., 2004; Wager
et al., 2005). The IFG/AI is active across tasks involving incon-
gruency, inhibition or working memory (including the ﬂanker,
go/no-go, stop signal, stimulus–response compatibility, Simon,
Stroop, and spatial- and verbal-working memory tasks; Nee et al.,
2007; McNab et al., 2008) including tasks involving semantic or
emotional incongruency that elicit the N400 evoked potential
(Maess et al., 2006; Van Petten and Luka, 2006), consistent with
a role of this area in a bias to working memory or attention that
increases processing of ambiguous stimuli. The IFG/AI also con-
sistently shows error-related activity (Wittfoth et al., 2008) which
may reﬂect increased processing after erroneous responses. More-
over, a meta-analysis suggested that there is an asymmetry in the
activation of the IFG/AI, left IFG/AI showing larger activation by
ﬂanker incongruency and right IFG/AI by errors (Ullsperger et al.,
2010).
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Flanker incongruency effects depend on speed–accuracy strat-
egy, the effects being larger when speed is stressed (Wylie et al.,
2009). The speed and accuracy of decision making have a well-
known trading relationship: hasty decisions are more prone to
errors while careful, accurate judgments take more time. Using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Ivanoff et al.
(2008) showed that emphasizing the speed of a perceptual decision
at the expense of its accuracy lowers the amount of evidence-
related activity in the IFG/AI that is gathered before responding.
Moreover, this speed–accuracy difference in activity correlated
with a behavioral measure of speed–accuracy difference in deci-
sion criterion. Thus, the IFG seems involved in elaborate atten-
tional and working memory processing that may facilitate fast and
accurate responding or slow responding in the case of prolonged
elaborate processing to increase accuracy of responding.
POST-ERROR SLOWING
It has been reported that post-error slowing was larger when
instruction stressed accuracy rather than speed (Jentzsch and
Leuthold, 2006; Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011). In a study by
Dudschig and Jentzsch (2009), post-error slowing was found to
be increased and performance more error-prone with a decreas-
ing response–stimulus interval, providing evidence for the idea
that error evaluation can produce substantial interference with
subsequent trial processing, particularly when there is insufﬁ-
cient time between the error and the subsequent event. Whereas
response–stimulus-intervalswere variedblock-wise in the studyby
Dudschig and Jentzsch, their result was replicated in a study that
varied response–stimulus-intervals trial-to-trial (Danielmeier and
Ullsperger, 2011). EEG alpha power during task performance was
recently shown to display error-related and incongruency-related
changes (Carp and Compton, 2009; Compton et al., 2011). While
alpha suggested temporary disengagement after correct responses,
after errors there appeared to be a failure to disengage which pre-
dicted post-error slowing. Indeed, depression is associated with
a decrease in accuracy, increased slowing and inability to dis-
engage after errors (Tucker et al., 2003; Compton et al., 2008)
and error-related negativity (ERN) ERP amplitude predicted post-
error slowing only among depressed participants in an emotional
Stroop task condition involving negative words (Compton et al.,
2008), suggesting a relationship in depression between slowing
and failure to disengage. Interestingly, color-naming reaction time
interference effects by threat stimuli in the emotional Stroop,
which has been associated with anxiety in numerous studies, also
appear to reﬂect slow disengagement from the previous trial, simi-
lar to what seems to be happening in post-error slowing (Phaf and
Kan, 2007). See for a discussion of the relation between post-error
slowing and anxiety, arousal, and orienting responses, Notebaert
et al. (2009) and Tops and Boksem (2011).
Unpublished results of a recent study (Tops and Boksem, 2010)
inwhich subjects performed the Eriksen ﬂanker task for 2.5 h, sup-
port that post-error processing may interfere with accurate next-
trial performance when prolonged elaborate processing interferes
with processing of the next stimulus. Over the whole group of
subjects, post-error slowing was only signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst inter-
val of the experiment (ﬁrst 20min), and parallel to increasing
reaction times, post-error accuracy in the ﬁrst intervals switched
to post-error inaccuracy in the last interval (i.e., the last 20min).
Moreover, in the ﬁrst interval, the only interval that showed both
signiﬁcant post-error slowing and post-error accuracy, post-error
accuracy was correlated with shorter reaction times. After con-
trolling for reaction times, post-error slowing predicted post-error
accuracy. This suggests that only when reaction times were short
the response–stimulus interval was long enough to beneﬁt from
the post-error processing,while when post-error processing added
up to longer overall reaction times, there was interference of post-
error continued engagement with the last trial with processing and
performance in the subsequent trial.
In contrast, in a task in which an error on a difﬁcult “lure”
trial predicted that the same lure would be repeated between
two and seven trials later, such that effects of post-error failure
to disengage were unlikely to interfere with performance on the
next lure trial, post-error slowing was related to increased accu-
racy on the next lure trial; the slowing and the increased accuracy
were predicted by activity in right IFG/AI, middle frontal gyrus,
and ACC (Hester et al., 2007). Right IFG activation is related to
post-error slowing after errors (Marco-Pallarés et al., 2008; King
et al., 2010) and after failures to inhibit responding (Li et al., 2008)
and lesions of the right inferior frontal sulcus reduced post-error
slowing (Molenberghs et al., 2009). A correlation has been found
between individual differences in post-error slowing and white
matter integrity beneath dorsal ACC regions that are connected to
the right IFG (Danielmeier et al., 2011).
In conclusion, post-error processing may be associated with
increased post-error accuracy, if conditions are such that post-
error processing does not interfere with performance in the
post-error trial. There are indications that prolonged process-
ing in the IFG/AI is involved in post-error slowing and either
post-error accuracy or post-error interference, depending on
response–stimulus timing.
POST-CONFLICT SLOWING
Verguts et al. (2011) recently reviewed and “introduced” the phe-
nomenon of post-conﬂict slowing. Previous studies suggested that
following incongruent trials subjects slow responses on the subse-
quent trialswhen task conditions trigger the need for the allocation
of attentional control, such as in the case of high conﬂict, percep-
tual ambiguity, or difﬁcult tasks (Ullsperger et al., 2005; Bugg,
2008; Verguts et al., 2011). This post-conﬂict slowing has been
interpreted as reﬂecting a speed–accuracy trade-off (Ullsperger
et al., 2005). Indeed, in our study mentioned in the previous
section (Tops and Boksem, 2010) more post-conﬂict slowing cor-
related with a speed–accuracy bias toward accuracy, as well as with
less ﬂanker congruency effect on accuracy (unpublished results).
Because post-conﬂict slowing is a less-described phenomenon
(Verguts et al., 2011), we will present an analysis of this effect from
our previous study (Tops and Boksem, 2010). We performed a
General Linear Model analysis of reaction times with as within-
subject factors ﬂanker congruency, post-incongruency (i.e., pre-
vious trial was a congruent vs. incongruent trial). There was a
main effect of post-incongruency [F(1,23)= 42.83, p< 0.0001]
showing that reaction times were longer when the previous
trial was incongruent (M = 488, SD= 64) than when the previ-
ous trial was congruent (M = 478, SD= 60). A similar analysis
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of proportion correct responses found a main effect of post-
incongruency [F(1,23)= 6.01, p< 0.05] showing that proportion
correct responses was higher when the previous trial was incon-
gruent (M = 0.924, SD= 0.034) than when the previous trial was
congruent (M = 0.911, SD= 0.044). Post-incongruency increase
in accuracy correlated negatively with reaction times (r =−0.62,
p< 0.001)1.
LONG-TERM GOALS
In proactive systems context models can assist in directing behav-
ior toward long- and short-timegoals. In reactive systems goals and
motivational stimuli can be held active by redundant attentional
and working memory processing and actually lead to persevera-
tion or obsessional behavior and rumination (Tucker et al., 1995;
Tops et al., 2010). We adhere to the view that mediodorsal areas
implement sustained episodic motivation control over behavioral
episodes (Kouneiher et al., 2009), guiding voluntary behavior
based on the history of actions and outcomes (Kennerley et al.,
2006), and context models. When action outcomes are unfavor-
able and/or contextmodels suggest it is better to stop the particular
endeavor, and do what “experience has taught you is best for you,”
the endeavor will be abandoned in favor of ﬂexible and adap-
tive switching to alternative endeavors or exploration. However,
adapted to low-predictable environments, the ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortical controls of reactive systems may persevere on a
potential opportunity to exploit (Tops et al., 2010). Maintenance
of drive, and retrieval and/or maintenance of goals in working
memory may keep goals active over time and in the face of resis-
tance and help to implement effortful control of behavior in the
service of long-range goals.
We sometimes use the label “proactive” to refer to the feed-
forward and context model-guided action control by the dorsal
systems. We think that the labels “proactive” and “reactive” may
help us connecting to an audience of social and clinical psychol-
ogists. However, the functions of the systems cannot be derived
from the labels, and the labels can even cause confusion. Elaborate
processing of stimuli in working memory at the expense of sub-
sequent stimuli may not seem “reactive” in some sense. Keeping
goals active in working memory seems to be part of what other
researchers called“proactive”or goal-directed, and contrastedwith
reactive, stimulus or cue-driven control (Dosenbach et al., 2007;
Braver et al., 2009; Aron, 2011). It is convenient and necessary to
sometimes use short labels to express which systems or parts of the
model are referred to, but no labels can capture the complexities
of the systems, and it is important not to derive system function
simply from the labels.
Elsewhere (Tops et al., 2010)we discussed how the combination
of a reactive approach system, a reactive avoidance system, and
a proactive or context model-guided system produces a model
that is very similar to a model that has recently been proposed
to integrate literatures on temperament and self-regulation sys-
tems, neuromodulatory function of serotonin, psychopathology,
1Notice that, because reaction time ﬂanker incongruency effects decrease with
increasing reaction times (in our study: r =−0.44, p< 0.05), post-conﬂict slowing
may cause a spurious conﬂict-adaptation-like effect (i.e., a decreased incongruency
effect following incongruent trials).
and neuroimaging studies of dorsal vs. ventral cortical function
(Carver et al., 2008, 2009). The model of Carver et al. was inspired
by the work of Mary Rothbart and Michael Posner on the devel-
opment of attention systems. We discussed the advantages of our
approach, and the need to distinguish between the dorsal sys-
tem on the one hand, and the controls that developed during
evolution in each of the ventral and dorsal systems on the other
hand. Related to this, we argued against the meaningfulness of an
emotion–cognition distinction: although dorsal context model-
guidance systems may on ﬁrst intuition appear more cognitive
compared to ventral reactive systems, each of them involves moti-
vation and emotion and controls that continued to develop during
evolution. And both dorsal and ventral control areas are impli-
cated in aspects of sustained performance control and task sets
(Dosenbach et al., 2007).
Additionally, the ventral cortical systems may have specialized
slightly differently in each hemisphere (Tops and Boksem, 2010).
We speculate that, at least relatively, in the left hemisphere the
ventrolateral pathways involved in cognitive control elaborated to
specialize in keeping goals active (reﬂecting in constraint, per-
sistence, determination; Schiff et al., 1998; Bunge et al., 2003;
Gusnard et al., 2003; Whittle et al., 2006; Stuss and Alexander,
2007; Li et al., 2008; Harmon-Jones et al., 2011a; cf. Bernal and
Altman, 2009; O’Reilly, 2010), while in the ventrolateral pathways
in the right hemisphere cognitive control elaboration specialized
in intense attentional absorption in the moment and keeping tar-
gets active (Hampshire et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2010; Higo et al.,
2011). This may be why in the left hemisphere the IFG/AI displays
stronger connections with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bilat-
eral supplementary motor area while in the right hemisphere the
IFG/AI displays stronger connections with the rostral ACC, STG,
and occipital cortex (Cauda et al., 2011).
ORIENTING AND IFG/AI TOP-DOWN CONTROL REFLECTED IN
fMRI, EEG, AND ERPs
IFG/AI TOP-DOWN CONTROL REFLECTED IN fMRI
The right IFG/AI may have an alarm/orienting function as part of
its critical role in the switching between internally and externally
oriented control modes in response to salient stimuli (Sridharan
et al., 2008). Moreover, the IFG/AI appears to exert top-down
control over sensory areas including STG or sulcus (STS) to coor-
dinate focal elaborate processing of target stimuli (Frye et al., 2010;
Leitman et al., 2010; Zanto et al., 2010; Chadick and Gazzaley,
2011; Higo et al., 2011), functional correlations being positive
or negative, depending on which stimulus is to be attended, and
which ignored (Higo et al., 2011). For example, the results of Leit-
man et al. (2010) suggested that sensory-integrative processing
is facilitated when the stimulus is rich in affective information,
yielding increased activation in STS and amygdala. Conversely,
when the stimulus is ambiguous, greater evaluative processes are
recruited, increasing activation in IFG and IFG–STS connectivity.
As another example, functional connectivity analysis of human
fMRI data revealed that visual cortical areas (fusiform face area
and parahippocampal place area) that selectively process task goal
relevant information are functionally connected with the ventral
attentional system areas including bilateral inferior frontal junc-
tion,whereas those that process irrelevant context information are
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simultaneously but dissociatably coupled with the “default mode
network” part of the dorsal system, which is activated by prospec-
tive/retrospective memory. This indicates that sensory cortical
regions are differentially and dynamically coupled with distinct
networks on the basis of task goals (Chadick and Gazzaley, 2011).
IFG/AI TOP-DOWN CONTROL REFLECTED IN EEG AND ERPs
The central role of IFG/AI in switching between networks and
exertion of top-down control (cf. Menon and Uddin, 2010) by
coupling with areas such as STG appears to go together with
synchronization of brain rhythms and generation of ERPs.
Midfrontal theta increase has been shown to predict post-error
slowing (Cavanagh et al., 2009). Subjects with stronger medial
frontal error-related theta also showed stronger white matter con-
nectivity between the medial frontal theta source and the IFG
and ventral striatum (Cohen, 2011). A correlation has been found
between individual differences in post-error slowing and white
matter integrity beneath dorsal ACC regions that are connected
to the right IFG (Danielmeier et al., 2011). Similarly, inhibition-
related increases in beta band power have been shown to relate
to increased post-error slowing (Marco-Pallarés et al., 2008) and
to right IFG activity through intracranial EEG recording (Swann
et al., 2009). Top-downcontrol fromIFG/AI that increases process-
ing in STS or visual cortices appearsmediated by coherence in low-
beta (12–14Hz; Frye et al., 2010) and alpha ranges (8–12Hz;Zanto
et al., 2010). An fMRI/EEG study found that theta-constrained
fMRI activation was strongest in the insula, temporal pole, STG,
and hippocampus (Sammer et al., 2007). Also alpha activity has
been related to activity in the insula in studies combining EEG
and fMRI measurements (Goldman et al., 2002; Martinez-Montes
et al., 2004). Alpha activity related to activity in the insula, thal-
amus, and parieto-occipital cortex. The source reconstruction
from the EEG spatial signature showed only the parieto-occipital
sources, suggesting that the insula participates in the control of
brain rhythms that it does not generate itself (Martinez-Montes
et al., 2004). It can similarly be hypothesized that the IFG/AI par-
ticipates in computations leading to ERP components, although
it does not, or only to a small extent, participate in the actual
generation of such components.
Even when other sources have been found also, the IFG/AI and
STG have been linked to several ERPs. Different measuring tech-
niques converge on the IFG and STS being involved in sensitivity
of the N400 potential to semantic and emotional incongruency
(Maess et al., 2006; Van Petten and Luka, 2006). During a switch
task including a go-delay response condition that was performed
in an fMRI and an ERP study, neither frontal N2 nor right IFG/AI
activity were associated with either task set switching or response
delaying per se. Instead, both were seen speciﬁcally for switching
to a mode of response delaying (Swainson et al., 2003). The signal
to switch from immediate to delayed responding may be simi-
lar to the signaling function of a perceived error during speeded
response time tasks to delay the next response until processing
of the erroneous trial is ﬁnished. Tomographical analyses of the
N2 difference observed in conditions of equal go and no-go trial
frequency localized N2 to the right IFG/AI and dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (Lavric et al., 2004). Error positivity (Pe) activity
after about 300ms that may relate to awareness of errors has been
hypothesized to reﬂect activity in IFG/AI (Ullsperger et al., 2010).
A recent MEG study found the late positive potential, which is
sensitive to stimulus saliency, and Pe, to share similar STS sources
(Helenius et al., 2010). The ventral cortical attentional saliency
network involving IFG/AI, STG, temporo-parietal junction, and
inferior parietal lobe, is sensitive to stimulus novelty and is the
neural basis of the P3 potential response to novelty (e.g., Horn
et al., 2003; Mulert et al., 2004; Gómez et al., 2008; Li et al.,
2009), and fMRI regions that correlate with the amplitude of the
P3 are insula, thalamus and right medial frontal gyrus (Horovitz
et al., 2002). The stimulus-preceding anticipatory relatively right-
lateralized negative potential that precedes aversive stimuli and
feedback and seems to depend on its affective–motivational prop-
erties, was localized into the IFG/AI (Böcker et al., 1994; Lavric
et al., 2008; Kotani et al., 2009; see also Brunia et al., 2000; Stern
and Mangels, 2006). Interactions between the IFG/AI and STG
have been implicated in the generation of the mismatch negativity
(Opitz et al., 2002; Doeller et al., 2003). Occasional tone omis-
sions elicited a signiﬁcant increase in right STG activity 140ms
after the omitted stimulus, followed 60ms later by right IFG activ-
ity (Tse et al., 2006). The functional relationship of STS and IFG
is consistent with both the contrast enhancement and response
inhibition accounts of IFG activity in passive deviance detection
(Tse and Penney, 2008). Finally, face stimuli trigger a vertex posi-
tive potential (VPP, P150)/N170 component of the ERP. There is
strong evidence that the fronto-central VPP and occipito-parieto-
temporal right-hemisphere-dominant N170 components can be
accounted for by the same dipolar conﬁguration, and the com-
ponents show identical functional properties (Joyce and Rossion,
2005). The component has been source localized to the STS, with
relative right lateralization (Itier and Taylor, 2004; Conty et al.,
2007) as well as correlated with activity in the STS in a fMRI study
(Horovitz et al., 2004).
IFG/AI TOP-DOWN CONTROL REFLECTED IN ERROR-RELATED ERPs
ERP studies have revealed a neural response to errors that has
been termed the ERN or error negativity (Ne; Falkenstein et al.,
1990; Gehring et al., 1990). The ERN/Ne is a negative ERP with a
fronto-central scalp distribution, peaking 60–110ms after an error
response and is thought to be generated by the ACC.
The IFG/AI may also be involved in the occurrence of the
ERN/Ne and Pe, ERP components that have been hypothesized to
reﬂect partial phase-locking of intermittent theta-band EEG activ-
ity (Luu et al., 2004). The degree of right AI activation has been
related to trait anxiety and the probability of selecting a “safe”
response following a punished response (Paulus et al., 2003). A
study that allowed subjects to reject trials to avoid errors, found
error-speciﬁc responses only in bilateral AI (Magno et al., 2006).
It is thought that the ERN/Ne is evoked by phasic reductions in
DA striatal input in response to non-reward, i.e., “reward overpre-
diction error” or “temporal difference prediction error.” An fMRI
study found that reward overprediction error produced decreased
ventral striatal activation, consistent with prediction error theory;
in addition, increased activation was found in the right IFG/AI
and right ACC (Abler et al., 2005). Left IFG/AI were active during
expectation of reward. The right AI has been shown to encode
aversive cue-related prediction errors during Pavlovian learning
www.frontiersin.org November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 330 | 9
Tops and Boksem IFG and control
of physical punishment (Seymour et al., 2004). Similarly, a recent
pharmacological fMRI study showed that, during instrumental
learning, reward prediction error was positively related to activ-
ity in the ventral striatum and posterior putamen, whereas during
loss trials an aversive prediction error-related to activity in right AI
(Pessiglione et al., 2006). Pharmacologically enhanceddopaminer-
gic activity improved choice performance toward monetary gains
but not avoidance of monetary losses, suggesting that the AI is
involved in a non-dopaminergically modulated mechanism of
aversive stimulus value processing during avoidance learning. A
similar dissociation has been found between anticipatory ventral
striatum activity related to subsequent ﬁnancial risk taking and
gain-seeking mistakes, vs. anticipatory AI activity related to sub-
sequent risk avoidance and loss-aversion mistakes (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005).
Indeed, the AI, together with the ACC, is the only prefrontal
cortical area that densely projects to the striosomes in the stria-
tum (Eblen and Graybiel, 1995) that are thought to be involved in
reward prediction error calculations and the generation of the
ERN/Ne in the ACC (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Thus, neural
activity in the IFG/AI could drive the activity of the mesolimbic
dopamine system, which would then be reﬂected back to the ACC
and other areas. Given the association of the ERN/Ne with pun-
ishment sensitivity, anxiety, and worry (see Boksem et al., 2006;
Tops and Boksem, 2011), the focus in the literature on possible
relationships between the ERN/Ne and reward prediction error
but neglect of possible relationships with punishment prediction
error is surprising. There appear to be physiological differences
between selecting actions to achieve rewards and selecting actions
to avoid losses (Pessiglione et al., 2006). Lesions involving the AI
decrease or abolish ERN/Ne amplitude, and when involving the
peri-insular white matter, disrupting connections to motor ACC,
and the striatum, severely impair error corrections (Ullsperger and
von Cramon, 2006).
To summarize, fMRI, EEG, and ERP studies converge on a role
of IFG/AI in top-down control over motor as well as sensory areas.
CONCLUSION
We reviewed evidence for a model in which the IFG/AI is involved
in elaborate attentional and working memory processing and we
presented the hypothesis that this processing may take different
forms and may have different effects, depending on the task at
hand: (1) it may facilitate fast and accurate responding, or (2)
it may cause slow responding when prolonged elaborate pro-
cessing is required to increase accuracy of responding, or (3) it
may interfere with accuracy and speed of next-trial (for instance,
post-error) performance when prolonged elaborate processing
interferes with processing of the next stimulus. We presented our
viewpoint that ventrolateral corticolimbic control pathways that
include the IFG/AI, and mediodorsal corticolimbic control path-
ways that include dorsal ACC areas, are interacting but partly
separable by their respective adaptations to environmental con-
ditions that differ in the level of predictability (Tops et al., 2010).
In the brain ventral corticolimbic control pathways have special-
ized in reactive behavioral control that incorporates fast associative
learning that is adaptive in low-predictable environments. This
contrasts to dorsal control pathways that specialized in guiding
behavior proactively by context models in long-term memory that
are formed and kept stable by slow learning, which is adaptive
in high-predictable environments. The reactive systems produce a
momentary, immediate sense of awareness, an experience of emo-
tional stimuli as being close in time and space. In our opinion,
both control pathways continued to develop during evolution, and
both developed their own “cognitive controls,” such that neither
one can be properly described as purely “cognitive” nor “emo-
tional.” We speculate that IFG/AI may exert top-down control
simultaneously over motor and sensory cortices to facilitate tight
sensory guided feedback control of ﬁne motoric ongoing actions
in the context of a goal that is held active simultaneously (high-
constraint control that may involve left hemisphere specialization;
Tucker et al., 1995). Additionally, IFG/AI may facilitate sensory
processing while preparing target-triggered responses, a type of
control that may involve right hemisphere specialization. We dis-
cussed literature that suggests that IFG/AI function in top-down
control modulates cortical rhythms and ERPs. Together, the lit-
erature suggests that the IFG/AI is an important node in brain
networks that control cognitive and emotional processing and
behavior.
Increasing attention to the role of IFG/AI in cognition and
emotion could have important implications for research on men-
tal health and psychopathology. For instance, the IFG/AI is among
the areas that most consistently show increased activity related
to anxiety and stress (see for a meta-analysis Etkin and Wager,
2007; for discussion Tops and Boksem, 2011). Also, antidepressant
effects of medication and sleep deprivation were correlated with
an activity shift from IFG/AI toward dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (Wu et al., 2008). A more global shift in activity from ventral
toward dorsal cortical systems related to antidepressant effects has
been discussed elsewhere, and may reﬂect difﬁculty to disengage
from problems and rumination which goes at the expense of pos-
itive prospective and retrospective memory in depression (Tucker
and Luu, 2007; Carver et al., 2008; Tops et al., 2010).
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